Submission Instructions
Contributions must be in English, original and not under review elsewhere. Each submission should include a separate title page containing the contact details of the author(s), an abstract (150-250 words) and a list of 4–6 keywords. All papers will be subject to double-anonymous peer-review. Manuscripts should be submitted online through the Synthese Editorial Manager (https://www.editorialmanager.com/synt), by selecting the Special Issue “S.I.: The Structure of Perceptual Objects” from the article type drop-down menu. For further details, please refer to the author guidelines available on the journal’s website:
www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/journal/11229
Appropriate topics for submission include, among others:
— The structure of modality-specific objects (auditory objects, visual objects, etc.)
— The structure of multimodal objects.
— Spatial structure of non-visual objects.
— The concept of “object” in other sense modalities, like acoustic objects, taste objects, etc.
— Do perceptual objects (both visual and non-visual) have a subject-predicate structure?
— The ontology and metaphysics of non-visual perceptual objects.
Submission Deadline
September 1, 2018
Extended Deadline!
October 1, 2018
www.springer.com/philosophy/epistemology+and+philosophy+of+science/journal/11229
Appropriate topics for submission include, among others:
— The structure of modality-specific objects (auditory objects, visual objects, etc.)
— The structure of multimodal objects.
— Spatial structure of non-visual objects.
— The concept of “object” in other sense modalities, like acoustic objects, taste objects, etc.
— Do perceptual objects (both visual and non-visual) have a subject-predicate structure?
— The ontology and metaphysics of non-visual perceptual objects.
Submission Deadline
September 1, 2018
Extended Deadline!
October 1, 2018
Topic Description
In the contemporary philosophy of mind and perception one of the most debated issues is the controversy over the nature of perceptual content. This debate has been recently fueled by the re-emergence of naïve realism that rejects the claim that perceptual experiences have conditions of accuracy (e.g. Brewer 2011; Crane 2009; Fish 2009). We call this the ‘mainstream’ debate in the philosophy of perception.
The mainstream debate has attracted much of the philosophers' attention, obscuring the issue of the structure of perceptual objects. In the past years, few philosophers have shown interest for the structure of visual objects, emphasizing their mereotopological structure (e.g. Mulligan & Smith 1988; Petitot 1994; Smith 1988, 2001). On this view, visual objects are complex entities made by elements that stand in different part-whole relations (e.g. Casati 2015). Although this line of research has a venerable history in vision science, from Rubin (1921) to the Gestalt psychology (e.g. Köhler 1929; Toccafondi 2000), and many contemporary studies (e.g. Pinna & Deiana 2015), it has been largely neglected by contemporary philosophers of perception.
Moreover, most philosophers of perception have focused on vision, with the often tacit assumption that their considerations might easily be extended to the other sense modalities. This visuocentrism, however, has already come under attack. One reason to be skeptical of it is that it may obscure significant differences among the sensory modalities. Furthermore, recent studies stress the multimodality of perceptual experiences (e.g., Kubovy & van Vankelburg 2001; O’Callaghan 2012, 2015). A theory of perceptual objects’ structure is needed to characterize what is the mode of combination that allows unifying unimodal objects into objects of multimodal experiences (Kubovy & Schutz 2010; Macpherson 2011; O’Callaghan 2015). While there exists a consensus that multimodal experiences are not only conjunctions of unimodal ones, it has not been established whether the relevant mode of combination should be characterized in terms of predication, parthood, or some other kind of relations.
The issue of the structure of perceptual objects intersects with classical issues in analytic metaphysics, like the notion of "object" and "property" and their relations, ranging from bundle and substratum theories to thoroughly nominalist accounts (e.g., Lowe 2006; Simons 1994). It is far from clear what kind of entity are perceptual objects, and whether we might articulate a single overarching metaphysical theory that accounts for all kinds of perceptual objects, like visual olfactory, multimodal, etc. In this context, structural questions are relevant for deciding whether it is justified to postulate a general notion of perceptual object that is applicable to items presented in different sense modalities (O’Callaghan 2008, 2016).
The problem of the structure of perceptual objects has different aspects. We believe that putting these issues back on the stage of academic discussion will shed light on many central issues in the philosophy of perception.
Short Reference List:
Brewer, B. (2011). Perception and Its Objects. New York: Oxford University Press.
Casati, R. (2015). Object Perception. In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Matthen, M. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.019.
Crane, T. (2009). Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236): 452-469.
Fish, W. (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fulkerson, M. (2011). The unity of haptic touch. Philosophical Psychology, 24(4): 493-516.
Köhler, W. (1929). Gestalt Theory. Oxford: Liverlight.
Kubovy, M. & von Valkenburg, D. (2001). Auditory and Visual Objects. Cognition, 80: 97-126.
Kubovy, M. & Schutz, M. (2010). Audio-Visual Objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 41-61.
Lowe, E. J. (2006). Four-Category Ontology. A Metaphysical Foundations for Natural Sciences. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Macpherson, F. (2011). Cross-Modal Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(3): 429-468.
Nudds, M. (2014). Auditory Appearances. Ratio, 27: 462-482.
Nudds, M. (2015). Audition. In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Matthen, M. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.019
O’Callaghan, C. (2008). Object Perception: Vision and Audition. Philosophy Compass, 3/4: 803-829.
O’Callaghan, C. (2012). Perception and Multimodality. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Margolis, E., Samuels, R., Stich, S. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.013.0005.
O’Callaghan, C. (2015). Not All Perceptual Experience is Modally Specific. In Perception and Its Modalities (pp. 133-165), Stokes, D., Matthen, M., Biggs, S. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Callaghan, C. (2016). Objects for Multisensory Perception. Philosophical Studies, 173: 1269-1289.
Petitot, J. (1994). Phénomenologie computationelle et objectivité morphologique. In La connaissance philosophique: Essais sur l’oeuvre de Giles-Gaston Granger (pp. 213-248), J. Proust & E. Schwartz (Eds.). Paris: Presses Universitaire de France.
Pinna, B. & Deiana, K. (2015). Material Properties from Contours: New Insights on Object Perception. Vision Research, 115: 280-301.
Richardson, L. (2013). Sniffing and Smelling. Philosophical Studies, 162: 401-419.
Rubin, E. (1921). Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren. Copenhagen: Glydendal.
Simons, P. (1994). Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54(3): 553-575.
Smith, B. (Ed.) (1988). Foundations of Gestalt Theory. Munich and Vienna: Philosophia.
Smith, B. (2001). Objects and Their Environments: From Aristotle to Ecological Ontology. In The Life and Motion of Social Economic Units (pp. 79-97). London: Taylor & Francis.
Smith, B. & Mulligan, K. (1988). Mach and Ehrenfels: The Foundations of Gestalt Theory. In. Smith (1988): 124-157.
Smith, B. (2015). The Chemical Senses. In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Matthen, M. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.019
Toccafondi, F. (2000). Il tutto e le parti: La Gestaltpsychologie tra filosofia e ricerca sperimentale (1912-1922). Milan: Franco Angeli.
In the contemporary philosophy of mind and perception one of the most debated issues is the controversy over the nature of perceptual content. This debate has been recently fueled by the re-emergence of naïve realism that rejects the claim that perceptual experiences have conditions of accuracy (e.g. Brewer 2011; Crane 2009; Fish 2009). We call this the ‘mainstream’ debate in the philosophy of perception.
The mainstream debate has attracted much of the philosophers' attention, obscuring the issue of the structure of perceptual objects. In the past years, few philosophers have shown interest for the structure of visual objects, emphasizing their mereotopological structure (e.g. Mulligan & Smith 1988; Petitot 1994; Smith 1988, 2001). On this view, visual objects are complex entities made by elements that stand in different part-whole relations (e.g. Casati 2015). Although this line of research has a venerable history in vision science, from Rubin (1921) to the Gestalt psychology (e.g. Köhler 1929; Toccafondi 2000), and many contemporary studies (e.g. Pinna & Deiana 2015), it has been largely neglected by contemporary philosophers of perception.
Moreover, most philosophers of perception have focused on vision, with the often tacit assumption that their considerations might easily be extended to the other sense modalities. This visuocentrism, however, has already come under attack. One reason to be skeptical of it is that it may obscure significant differences among the sensory modalities. Furthermore, recent studies stress the multimodality of perceptual experiences (e.g., Kubovy & van Vankelburg 2001; O’Callaghan 2012, 2015). A theory of perceptual objects’ structure is needed to characterize what is the mode of combination that allows unifying unimodal objects into objects of multimodal experiences (Kubovy & Schutz 2010; Macpherson 2011; O’Callaghan 2015). While there exists a consensus that multimodal experiences are not only conjunctions of unimodal ones, it has not been established whether the relevant mode of combination should be characterized in terms of predication, parthood, or some other kind of relations.
The issue of the structure of perceptual objects intersects with classical issues in analytic metaphysics, like the notion of "object" and "property" and their relations, ranging from bundle and substratum theories to thoroughly nominalist accounts (e.g., Lowe 2006; Simons 1994). It is far from clear what kind of entity are perceptual objects, and whether we might articulate a single overarching metaphysical theory that accounts for all kinds of perceptual objects, like visual olfactory, multimodal, etc. In this context, structural questions are relevant for deciding whether it is justified to postulate a general notion of perceptual object that is applicable to items presented in different sense modalities (O’Callaghan 2008, 2016).
The problem of the structure of perceptual objects has different aspects. We believe that putting these issues back on the stage of academic discussion will shed light on many central issues in the philosophy of perception.
Short Reference List:
Brewer, B. (2011). Perception and Its Objects. New York: Oxford University Press.
Casati, R. (2015). Object Perception. In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Matthen, M. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.019.
Crane, T. (2009). Is Perception a Propositional Attitude? The Philosophical Quarterly, 59(236): 452-469.
Fish, W. (2009). Perception, Hallucination, and Illusion. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fulkerson, M. (2011). The unity of haptic touch. Philosophical Psychology, 24(4): 493-516.
Köhler, W. (1929). Gestalt Theory. Oxford: Liverlight.
Kubovy, M. & von Valkenburg, D. (2001). Auditory and Visual Objects. Cognition, 80: 97-126.
Kubovy, M. & Schutz, M. (2010). Audio-Visual Objects. Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1: 41-61.
Lowe, E. J. (2006). Four-Category Ontology. A Metaphysical Foundations for Natural Sciences. Clarendon Press: Oxford.
Macpherson, F. (2011). Cross-Modal Experiences. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 111(3): 429-468.
Nudds, M. (2014). Auditory Appearances. Ratio, 27: 462-482.
Nudds, M. (2015). Audition. In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Matthen, M. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.019
O’Callaghan, C. (2008). Object Perception: Vision and Audition. Philosophy Compass, 3/4: 803-829.
O’Callaghan, C. (2012). Perception and Multimodality. In Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Margolis, E., Samuels, R., Stich, S. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780195309799.013.0005.
O’Callaghan, C. (2015). Not All Perceptual Experience is Modally Specific. In Perception and Its Modalities (pp. 133-165), Stokes, D., Matthen, M., Biggs, S. (Eds.). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
O’Callaghan, C. (2016). Objects for Multisensory Perception. Philosophical Studies, 173: 1269-1289.
Petitot, J. (1994). Phénomenologie computationelle et objectivité morphologique. In La connaissance philosophique: Essais sur l’oeuvre de Giles-Gaston Granger (pp. 213-248), J. Proust & E. Schwartz (Eds.). Paris: Presses Universitaire de France.
Pinna, B. & Deiana, K. (2015). Material Properties from Contours: New Insights on Object Perception. Vision Research, 115: 280-301.
Richardson, L. (2013). Sniffing and Smelling. Philosophical Studies, 162: 401-419.
Rubin, E. (1921). Visuell wahrgenommene Figuren. Copenhagen: Glydendal.
Simons, P. (1994). Particulars in Particular Clothing: Three Trope Theories of Substance. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 54(3): 553-575.
Smith, B. (Ed.) (1988). Foundations of Gestalt Theory. Munich and Vienna: Philosophia.
Smith, B. (2001). Objects and Their Environments: From Aristotle to Ecological Ontology. In The Life and Motion of Social Economic Units (pp. 79-97). London: Taylor & Francis.
Smith, B. & Mulligan, K. (1988). Mach and Ehrenfels: The Foundations of Gestalt Theory. In. Smith (1988): 124-157.
Smith, B. (2015). The Chemical Senses. In The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Matthen, M. (Ed.). Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199600472.013.019
Toccafondi, F. (2000). Il tutto e le parti: La Gestaltpsychologie tra filosofia e ricerca sperimentale (1912-1922). Milan: Franco Angeli.